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Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
New York: Oxford University Press (2014)
Abstract
Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in lifeAuthor's Profile
Reprint years
2016
Call number
BJ1461.P474 2014
ISBN(s)
9780199685516 0199685517 9780198776864 0198776861 9780191765674
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Similar books and articles
Free Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Skepticism about Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2013 - In Gregg Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books. pp. 19.
Living without free will: The case for hard incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):477-488.
The origin of agency, consciousness, and free will.J. H. van Hateren - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):979-1000.
Libet and the case for free will scepticism.Tim Bayne - 2011 - In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
Introduction: Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - 2013 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso (ed.) - 2013 - Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Defending hard incompatibilism again.Derk Pereboom - 2008 - In Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (eds.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 1--33.
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Citations of this work
Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):89-115.
Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model.Gregg D. Caruso - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):25-48.
There Is No Techno-Responsibility Gap.Daniel W. Tigard - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (3):589-607.
Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame.David Shoemaker - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (4):481-527.
References found in this work
The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument.Kristin Mickelson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617.
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