Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139 (2015)
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Abstract

Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and thereby a rejection of the equality of persons, which we argue grounds the standing to blame others.

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Author Profiles

Kyle G. Fritz
University of Mississippi
Daniel J. Miller
West Virginia University

Citations of this work

Epistemic blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.
The Walk and the Talk.Daniela Dover - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):387-422.
Explaining Loss of Standing to Blame.Justin Snedegar - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (3-4):404-432.
The paradox of self-blame.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):111–125.

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References found in this work

Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Conversation and Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.

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