A Standing Asymmetry between Blame and Forgiveness

Ethics 132 (4):759-786 (2022)
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Abstract

Sometimes it is not one’s place to blame or forgive. This phenomenon is captured under the philosophical notion of standing. However, there is an asymmetry to be explained here. One can successfully blame, even if one lacks the standing to do so. Yet, one cannot successfully forgive if one lacks the standing to do so. In this article we explain this asymmetry. We argue that a complete explanation depends on not only a difference in the natures of the standing to blame and forgive but also a difference in the natures of blame and forgiveness themselves.

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Author Profiles

Kyle G. Fritz
University of Mississippi
Daniel J. Miller
West Virginia University

Citations of this work

Explaining Loss of Standing to Blame.Justin Snedegar - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (3-4):404-432.
Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame.Kyle Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139.
Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons.R. Jay Wallace - 2010 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (4):307-341.
Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.

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