Introduction to Hume on Motivation and Virtue

In Hume on Motivation and Virtue. pp. 1-29 (2009)
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Abstract

This includes a methodological meditation (in blank verse) on the history of philosophy as a contribution to philosophy (rather than as a contribution to history) plus a conspectus of the issues surrounding Hume, the Motivation Argument and the Slavery of Reason Thesis. However I am posting it here mainly because it contains a novel restatement of the Argument from Queerness. Big Thesis: the Slavery of Reason Thesis (via the Motivation Argument) provides no support for non-cognitivism or emotivism, but there is a plausible version of the Slavery of Reason Thesis that provides some support for the Error Theory. As in other papers I stress the importance of DTADs, dispositions to acquire desires as well as desires conceived as propositional attitudes.

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Charles R. Pigden
University of Otago

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