Abstract
At first glance, Fichte and Nietzsche may strike us as intellectual contraries. For example, Fichte’s belief in historical progress and universal moral law appears to be diametrically opposed to Nietzsche’s searching critique of Enlightenment optimism. This impression is reinforced by Nietzsche’s disparaging remarks about Fichte. What is more, from the dearth of critical literature comparing the two thinkers, one might be tempted to conclude that they are broadly irrelevant to one another. In this paper, however, I argue that their theories of subjectivity are in many respects remarkably similar and worthy of comparison. But I also explain how, despite this convergence, their normative philosophies end up so conspicuously at odds with one another. I begin by examining the resemblance between their denials of the substantial self (Section 1). In Sections 2 and 3, I analyse Fichte’s and Nietzsche’s positive accounts of subjectivity, self-cultivation, and the political preconditions of self-cultivation. In these latter two sections, I focus on pinpointing the conceptual juncture at which their practical outlooks begin to part, which I argue can be located in their drive psychologies and their distinct conceptions of conscience (Gewissen). These theoretical differences then generate a large-scale disagreement regarding the political systems they believe best enable self-cultivation, with Fichte favouring for a democratic regime, and Nietzsche opting for an aristocratic one. I conclude Section 3 by sketching a possible way out of this dilemma.