Abstract

This paper aims to clear two regular misunderstandings when comparing the thoughts of Gilles Deleuze and Martin Heidegger: firstly, the alleged opposition between Heideggerian negativity and Deleuzian positivity; secondly, the assumed contrariety between Deleuzian immanence and Heideggerian transcendence. In this fashion, the proposal is not so much to point at coincidences as to underline the fact that the differences are not where they are usually sought. The method used consists in taking Deleuze’s mentions to Heidegger in Difference and Repetition as a common thread for tracking the Deleuzian use of Heideggerian concepts. We will attempt to show that both aspects of the Deleuzian transcendental field, the virtual and the intensive, hold a certain “negativity” and “concealment”, respectively, which runs against the picture of Deleuze as a philosopher of thorough and unconcealed manifestation. We will likewise argue that Heideggerian transcendence is not necessarily opposed to Deleuzian immanence, and that the Heideggerian concepts of Zwiefalt and Selbe are used by Deleuze in order to think of immanence. We contend that the distinction between the negative and the problematic allows Deleuze to speak of being even while accepting ontological difference.