A clear and concise introduction to Gilles Deleuze's complex relationship with the various fields of theology.

In this article, I confront Marcella Althaus-Reid’s thinking with the recent ‘negative turn’ in queer theory, as observed by Judith Halberstam. What remains when the belief in our world as such, and in the future of it, has to be totally rejected, as some queer theorists like Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman, for example, claim? Or, in theological terms: what could the categories of redemption, salvation and liberation still mean if one wishes to think God within history, but at the (...) same time rejects this history? I investigate these questions by focusing on two central concepts of Althaus-Reid’s indecent theology, incarnation and redemption. First, brought into dialogue with negative queer politics, I argue that Althaus-Reid helps us to develop an understanding of radical incarnation in the flesh on the ‘underside’ of society. Second, I look at Althaus-Reid’s critique of the traditional Christian understanding of redemption and her alternative of a notion of redemption that is connected to love, solidarity and reciprocity, instead of to a one-way act of grace by a transcendent God. I conclude that a ‘negative queer theology’, when developed in line with Althaus-Reid’s insights, necessarily maintains an affirmative undercurrent, a belief in an unknown life. (shrink)

The point of departure of this article is Martin Heidegger’s relation to two core problems of theology today: representation and transcendence. Concerning the first issue, it is known that Heidegger provided a thorough critique on representation as ontotheology. But as for the second problem, transcendence beyond representation, Heidegger remains ambiguous. His concept of Ereignis can be considered as both a transcendent and an immanent event. In the second part of this article, I try to ‘resolve’ this ambiguity in confronting it (...) with Deleuze’s purely immanent ontology. What comes out is a redefinition of transcendence in Heidegger and Deleuze as a ‘transcendence within immanence.’. (shrink)

The point of departure of this article is Martin Heidegger’s relation to two core problems of theology today: representation and transcendence. Concerning the first issue, it is known that Heidegger provided a thorough critique on representation as ontotheology. But as for the second problem, transcendence beyond representation, Heidegger remains ambiguous. His concept of Ereignis can be considered as both a transcendent and an immanent event. In the second part of this article, I try to ‘resolve’ this ambiguity in confronting it (...) with Deleuze’s purely immanent ontology. What comes out is a redefinition of transcendence in Heidegger and Deleuze as a ‘transcendence within immanence.’. (shrink)

L’interprétation de la philosophie de Gilles Deleuze comme «projet de rédemption» fait de lui un candidat propre à une évaluation théologique. Afin de révéler l’importance potentielle de Deleuze pour la théologie, je me concentre d’abord sur les caractéristiques mêmes de ce projet de rédemption. Dans la deuxième partie de cet article, je confronte les idées de Deleuze à la théologie de la libération. Est-ce que sa vision politique est assez forte pour pouvoir supporter une théologie de la libération ou offre-t-il (...) plutôt une «ontologie pour le bouddhiste occidental»? Je conclurai que la pensée de Deleuze tend vers cette deuxième option. (shrink)

Neurotheology is a rather young scientific discipline that investigates the common biological basis of religion in our brain. Because neurotheologians do not fear to draw theological conclusions from their scientific research results, the phenomenon of neurotheology can be an interesting focus of the widespread dialogue between science and religion. The first part of this article is dedicated to a detailed presentation of the project of neurotheology. I discuss the research results of Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg, pioneers of the neurotheological (...) discipline, who discovered that, during a ‘religious experience’, a certain part of the brain receives less blood so that the distinction between the self and its environment drops. The result is that the test subject feels united with the cosmos. Neurotheologians thus assert that all religions arise from this capacity of the brain to transcend the ‘I’. In the second part of this article, I formulate some severe critiques on the project of eurotheology from a strict scientific perspective, but also from an anthropological and theological point of view. The core of the problem, I argue, is situated in the kind of connection that is made between a scientific observation and a phenomenological experience. By calling the brain the basis of any religious experience, d’Aquili and Newberg develop what we can call a ‘theologized neurology’. In a third, more tentative part, I suggest another way in which we can relate neurology and theology without domesticating or reducing the transcendent, by thoroughly examining the meaning of the research results of the neurosciences in a more philosophical reflection. (shrink)

Neurotheology is a rather young scientific discipline that investigates the common biological basis of religion in our brain. Because neurotheologians do not fear to draw theological conclusions from their scientific research results, the phenomenon of neurotheology can be an interesting focus of the widespread dialogue between science and religion. The first part of this article is dedicated to a detailed presentation of the project of neurotheology. I discuss the research results of Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg, pioneers of the neurotheological (...) discipline, who discovered that, during a ‘religious experience’, a certain part of the brain receives less blood so that the distinction between the self and its environment drops. The result is that the test subject feels united with the cosmos. Neurotheologians thus assert that all religions arise from this capacity of the brain to transcend the ‘I’. In the second part of this article, I formulate some severe critiques on the project of eurotheology from a strict scientific perspective, but also from an anthropological and theological point of view. The core of the problem, I argue, is situated in the kind of connection that is made between a scientific observation and a phenomenological experience. By calling the brain the basis of any religious experience, d’Aquili and Newberg develop what we can call a ‘theologized neurology’. In a third, more tentative part, I suggest another way in which we can relate neurology and theology without domesticating or reducing the transcendent, by thoroughly examining the meaning of the research results of the neurosciences in a more philosophical reflection. (shrink)