Abstract

In my dissertation I examine the concept of subjectivity which follows from the basic principles of Husserl's phenomenology. These principles are the theory of wholes and parts, the concept of categorial intuition with its inherent notion of constitution, and the phenomenological sense of the apriori. Although I take my point of departure in themes originally introduced by Husserl, my thesis discusses their treatment in Heidegger's early philosophy. It is my contention that Heidegger's existential analytic, as it was developed in his Marburg period , is an investigation of subjectivity that is founded on these phenomenological principles. ;My thesis is that Husserl's fundamental discoveries render possible an eidetic investigation of human being that is descriptive. More than any philosopher, Heidegger was alert to the necessity of providing every step of his analysis of Dasein with a descriptive basis. He constantly warns against constructive interpretations of subjectivity. That is the fundamental mistake of traditional metaphysics. In his existential analytic, this commitment to evidence is apparent in the treatment of themes such as anxiety and being-towards-death. These themes designate specific experiences in which the being of Dasein is given in intuition. ;This descriptive approach enables Heidegger to revitalize the Kantian insight that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception, thus presenting an ego-less synthesis prior to reflections accompanied by the 'I think'. However, Heidegger transcends Kant in his treatment of this prior synthesis. Firstly, he shows how it is given in intuition, thus avoiding a constructive approach. Secondly, Heidegger brings the perspective back to Aristotle and identifies the prior synthesis with Phronesis--which is a Praxis, and thus is an activity which is its own end. Thirdly, he interprets this prior synthesis in a temporal manner. It is my argument that this approach to self-consciousness enables Heidegger to establish a transcendental subject whose primacy over the world is not that of appearing independently of the world, and whose constituting activity is non-constructive