Abstract

In this dissertation, I argue that because contemporary moral philosophers have largely overlooked the category of imperfect duties, our moral theorizing is impoverished. In order to remedy this defect, I offer a critical review of historically influential definitions of imperfect duties, and then propose a new definition that combines the strengths of these other accounts without sharing their weaknesses. I show how making use of imperfect duties would allow us to do a much better job of accounting, in our moral theorizing, for some important and widely-held intuitions. ;I begin with a Metaethical Preface that explains how I see my work fitting into the landscape of contemporary ethical theory. In Chapter 1, I address methodological issues, and then argue that standard models of moral obligation need to be supplemented by a category of imperfect duties. Chapter 2 presents the most influential theoretical substitutes for imperfect duties, supererogation and virtue, and points out their weaknesses and limitations. In Chapter 3, I argue that no historically influential definition of imperfect duties is entirely satisfactory, and thus that a new definition is needed. I present my own definition of imperfect duties and examine its implications in chapter 4. Finally, in chapter 5, I respond to criticisms on the part of those who do not think that the work imperfect duties are particularly well suited to perform is worth doing in the first place. ;My key claim is that imperfect duties are best understood as duties to contribute to the fulfillment of an unlimited task, while perfect duties are duties to perform, or refrain from performing, a specified limited task. Because the two types of duties involve fundamentally different kinds of tasks, their satisfaction conditions differ as well. Perfect duties are such that there is nothing further one could do that would count as fulfillingtheir requirements once one is in compliance with them. Imperfect duties are duties such that being in compliance with them does not rule out the possibility of doing more that would also count as complying