Robust program equilibrium

Theory and Decision 86 (1):143-159 (2019)
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Abstract

One approach to achieving cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma is Tennenholtz’s (Games Econ Behav 49(2):363–373, 2004) program equilibrium, in which the players of a game submit programs instead of strategies. These programs are then allowed to read each other’s source code to decide which action to take. As shown by Tennenholtz, cooperation is played in an equilibrium of this alternative game. In particular, he proposes that the two players submit the same version of the following program: cooperate if the opponent is an exact copy of this program and defect otherwise. Neither of the two players can benefit from submitting a different program. Unfortunately, this equilibrium is fragile and unlikely to be realized in practice. We thus propose a new, simple program to achieve more robust cooperative program equilibria: cooperate with some small probability

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Caspar Oesterheld
Duke University

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References found in this work

Modeling Rational Players: Part I.Ken Binmore - 1987 - Economics and Philosophy 3 (2):179-214.
Cooperation in the Prisoni.J. V. Howard - 1988 - Theory and Decision 24 (3):203.
Modeling Rational Players: Part II.Ken Binmore - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (1):9-55.

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