Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study

Theory and Decision 82 (3):415-433 (2017)
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Abstract

We experimentally investigate the role of information transparency for equilibrium selection in stag hunt coordination games. These games can be transformed from a prisoner’s dilemma game by introducing a centralized reward or punishment scheme. We aim to explore the impact of the disclosure of information on how final payoffs are derived on players’ incentive to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. We find that such information disclosure significantly increases the tendency of players to play the payoff-dominant strategy and reduces the occurrence of coordination failure. The mechanism works directly through the positive impact of disclosure on the saliency of the payoff-dominant equilibrium, and indirectly through the positive influence of disclosure on players’ belief about the likelihood of cooperation by the opponent.

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Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229-236.

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