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Pure-strategy Equilibria with Non-expected Utility Players
Theory and Decision 46 (2):201-212 (1999)
Abstract
A pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem is extended to include games with non-expected utility players. It is shown that to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, the linearity of preferences in the probabilities can be replaced by the weaker requirement of quasiconvexity in the probabilitiesLinks
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Citations of this work
Nash was a first to axiomatize expected utility.Han Bleichrodt, Chen Li, Ivan Moscati & Peter P. Wakker - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (3):309-312.
References found in this work
On games under expected utility with rank dependent probabilities.Klaus Ritzberger - 1996 - Theory and Decision 40 (1):1-27.
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