Virtual reality, ontology, and value

Metaphilosophy 37 (5):673-690 (2006)
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This article raises the question of how the ontological status of virtual objects bears on their intrinsic value. If virtual objects are unreal or less real than physical objects, does it mean that they will have less intrinsic value? If they have intrinsic value, what are the explanations for this value, and how do they relate to the ontological status of the virtual objects? First, the article reviews recent work concerning the ontological status of virtual reality and virtual objects. Second, it argues that in some cases the ontological status of virtual objects does undermine the value placed in them, in that the objects can fail to have the properties that ground the value attributions made to them, while in other cases their ontological status is not important. Finally, the article relates the grounding of value attributions to philosophical theories of value, in particular, perfectionism and hedonism.



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Norman Mooradian
San Jose State University

References found in this work

The methods of ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1874 - Bristol, U.K.: Thoemmes Press. Edited by Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones.
Perfectionism.Thomas Hurka - 1993 - New York, US: Oxford University Press. Edited by Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser.
Real People. Personal Identity without Thought Experiments.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1990 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52 (1):170-171.
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