Abstract

In this dissertation we will be concerned with the nature of persons. Many philosophers have wanted to hold that persons are radically different types of entities from ordinary persisting physical objects. The main aim of this dissertation is to show that any view of this kind is completely wrong, that a correct account of the nature and persistences of persons must be a physicalistic one. We shall defend this physicalistic account of persons both by attacking historical and contemporary arguments which purport to support a nonphysicalistic view of persons as well as by producing positive arguments of our own. ;This dissertation is made up of six chapters. The four middle chapters constitute the main body of the dissertation. ;In chapter two we shall show that Cartesian arguments, although sympathetically interpreted for the view that persons are nonphysical "spiritual substances" do not succeed. ;In chapter three we shall show sympathy for Locke's seemingly nonphysicalistic "memory" criterion for the persistence of persons but argue that there is no conflict between Locke's account and memory must appeal to some sort of physical continuity. ;In chapter four we will provide further reinforcement for our physicalistic account by showing that the whole conception of a purely nonphysical substance or event is incoherent by developing an argument from causation which shows that the whole conception of a nonphysical substance or event is incoherent. Taken together chapters three and four constitute the core of our positive argument that persons are physical. ;Finally in chapter five we shall examine certain residual arguments from the imagination suggested by Kant's Paralogisms which purport to show that persons are nonphysical and we shall argue that there is no reason to be persuaded by them