Bioethics 24 (9):481-489 (2010)

Authors
David Shoemaker
Cornell University
Abstract
It has long been thought that certain key bioethical views depend heavily on work in personal identity theory, regarding questions of either our essence or the conditions of our numerical identity across time. In this paper I argue to the contrary, that personal identity is actually not significant at all in this arena. Specifically, I explore three topics where considerations of identity are thought to be essential – abortion, definition of death, and advance directives – and I show in each case that the significant work is being done by a relation other than identity
Keywords abortion  David DeGrazia  advance directives  Jeff McMahan  death  personal identity  Don Marquis
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01719.x
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Abortion and Ectogenesis: Moral Compromise.William Simkulet - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (2):93-98.
The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism.David Shoemaker - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 303-328.
Public Reason.Jonathan Quong - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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