On mechanical recognition

Philosophy of Science 43 (1):24-52 (1976)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that human pattern recognition can be simulated by automata. In particular, I show that gestalt recognition and recognition of family resemblances are within the capabilities of sufficiently complex Turing machines. The argument rests on elementary facts of automata and computability theory which are used to explicate our preanalytic, informal concepts concerning gestalt patterns and recognition. The central idea is that of a machine which "knows" its own structure. Although the paper thus aims to support mechanism, especially as a framework hypothesis for perception, it contains suggestions for philosophy of science and philosophy of language as well. Some of these suggestions are sketched in the final section

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Citations of this work

The meaning of representation in animal memory.H. L. Roitblat - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):353-372.
Cognitive psychology's representation of behaviorism.A. W. Logue - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):381-382.
The informational character of representations.Fred Dretske - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):376-377.
Representation: A concept that fills no gaps.Robert Epstein - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):377-378.
Misrepresenting behaviorism.Marc N. Branch - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):372-373.

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References found in this work

Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
What Computers Can't Do.H. Dreyfus - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):177-185.

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