Knowledge is extrinsically apt belief. Virtue-epistemology and the temporal objection

In Chris Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Epistemology. Cambridge, Royaume-Uni: (forthcoming)

Anne Meylan
University of Zürich
According to Sosa’s virtue epistemological account, an instance of (animal) knowledge is a belief that instantiates the property of being apt. The purpose of this contribution is, first, to show why this claim is, without further clarification, problematic. Briefly, an instance of knowledge cannot be identified to an apt belief because beliefs are states and aptness is a property that only actions —and no states— can exemplify. Second, I present the metaphysical amendment that the tenants of virtue epistemology can adopt in order to avoid this objection. This conducts me to suggest a new, metaphysically sounder version of the virtue epistemological account of knowledge in which knowledge is extrinsically apt belief.
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