Competence to know

Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue against traditional virtue epistemology on which knowledge is a success due to a competence to believe truly, by revealing an in-principle problem with the traditional virtue epistemologist’s explanation of Gettier cases. The argument eliminates one of the last plausible explanation of Gettier cases, and so of knowledge, in terms of non-factive mental states and non-mental conditions. I then I develop and defend a different kind of virtue epistemology, on which knowledge is an exercise of a competence to know. I show how the account, while circular, is not viciously so. It explains both how knowledge is a mental state, as well as the relationship between knowledge and justification, including justified false beliefs and Gettier cases. Moreover, although direct virtue epistemology is compatible with many views on the nature of belief, it can explain how knowledge might be metaphysically more fundamental than belief as well

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Knowing Without Having The Competence to Do So.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):110-118.
Sosa’s virtue account vs. responsibilism.Xingming Hu - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-16.
Accidentally factive mental states.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Gettier For Justification.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):305-318.
Virtue epistemology and the Gettier dilemma.Ian M. Church - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (5):681-695.
On the Possibility of Gettier Cases for Modal Knowledge.Alexandru Dragomir - 2022 - Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 66 (2):315-326.
Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):531-549.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-05-22

Downloads
398 (#54,470)

6 months
19 (#182,156)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lisa Titus
University of Denver

Citations of this work

Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 1999 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
Skill.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):713-726.

View all 91 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.

View all 76 references / Add more references