Abstract

By the term ‘mimeisthai’ (to imitate), as used to refer to a skilled activity (technè), was originally and primarily meant in pre-Platonic writings: the performance of acting and speaking persons in dance and the theatre and, on the other hand, the making of unmoving images in plastic art. In Plato the notion of artistic imitation (mimèsis ) is gradually extended to epic poetry (Republic). But in Laws finally all forms of muse-art (mousikè) - poetry, dance and music - as also the arts of painting and sculpting are incorporated in the category of (artistic) ‘mimesis’. This could, however, only occur at the expense of a clear weakening of the original and pregnant meaning of the term ‘mimèsis’, whereby the idea of an active bringing about of sensible likenesses sank into the background: ‘mimèsis’ means then still as much as depiction or symbolic representation in general. Over and above ‘poetic’ representations are reproached on the grounds that - as a rule - they are untrue and deceptive (and thus also once again ‘imitations’ in the pejorative meaning of the word), that their ontological status is insignificant, and especially that they are morally pernicious. The consequence is that musical art (poetry and the dance and music tied to the poetic word) can no longer count as a proper art (technè), insofar as the latter needs to be based on genuine knowledge (epistèmè). Due to all these objections Plato considers that he must deny a right to existence (or civic right) to the muse-arts. But the plastic arts must also suffer. These are at best capable of reflecting the changing facets of the external manner of appearance of things and not what the things are essentially. They do not render genuine knowledge either, are not real arts (technè) and move - just like the muse-arts - in a world of ontological appearance. The only genres and themes of artistic mimèsis still tolerated in the ideal state are hymns to the gods and songs of praise for virtuous people (Republic). This decision is upheld in its entirety in Laws, where Plato makes a conditional plea on the behalf of the mimetic arts - he looks for the conditions which the practice of these arts must fulfil in order to be admitted by the guardians of the state. In this dialogue Plato defends the thesis that only the artistic imitations in which ethical models of high standing (human behaviour and characters ) - constitutive condition - in a correct manner (orthos) - logical condition - are represented, can be held to be ‘beautiful’ (eu, kalos). The only use and at the same time the only justification of the mimetic art lies in the moral good that can and must be brought about by this art. Plato undoubtedly considers the ‘phenomenal’ beauty of artistic work as a specific dimension of it; but he resolutely refuses to attribute any autonomy to it and equally he wishes not to appeal to it, even were it only for a partial justification of the mimetic work of art. If the phenomenal beauty is not at the same time subordinated to a correct imitation of ethically excellent models, a work of art - however fascinating it may be otherwise - cannot pass for ‘eu’ or ‘kalos’. In this respect it is highly significant that Plato in Laws insists that the task of composing hymns to the gods and songs of praise for virtuous men should only be entrusted to men who themselves are virtuous, even if these should lack natural musical talent. That Plato expects a mimetic work of art to furnish a correct depiction of models, which are worthy of the name, cannot be interpreted as if he were a champion of or at least took pleasure in a ‘naive’ or ‘flat’ realism, as some wish to convey. But no more can Plato be promoted to being a champion of an ‘idealising’ art, under the pretext that the mimetic artists should imitate the ‘Ideas’. Plato repeatedly and explicitely professes that mimetic artists, due to the special kind of imitation they exercise, are only able to imitate or represent sensible phenomena. Finally, in regard to the famous adage, ‘ars imitatur naturam’: this can in no way be traced back to Plato. Nowhere did Plato assert that all arts which we now refer to as ‘fine’ arts, are imitative arts (e.g. architecture). Even less did he raise up the (correct) imitation (of the phenomenal view) of nature to a constitutive, not to speak of a self-sufficient norm for the artistic beauty of a (mimetic) work of art. In other words, a consequent ‘realistic’ norm - in whatever meaning - for judging the proper significance of the work of art cannot under any conditions be attributed to Plato (trans, by J. Dudley)