Allegorical interpretation of the ancient Greek myths began not with the grammarians, but with the philosophers. As speculative thought developed, there grew up also the belief that in mystical and symbolic terms the ancient poets had expressed profound truths which were difficult to define in scientifically exact language. Assuming that the myth-makers were concerned to edify and to instruct, the philosophers found in apparent immoralities and impieties a warning that both in offensive and in inoffensive passages one must look beneath (...) the surface for the true significance of the tales. Thus allegory was originally positive, not negative, in its aim; its purpose was not so much to defend the poetic traditions against charges of immorality as to make fully explicit the wealth of doctrine which ex hypothesi the myths contained. Those who wrote to defend the poets could, if they chose, make some use of the results of the allegorical method; passages to which exception had been taken could be shown by allegorical treatment to be quite consistent with the view that the poets were wise and divinely inspired. But the first dim beginnings of allegory can be traced to another and a weightier motive—namely, the desire of speculative thinkers to appropriate for their own use some at least of the mythical traditions. Nor is there any reason to doubt that the same motive was the main driving force in the later history of allegorical interpretation. Objectionable passages were, indeed, regarded as among the richest in deeper meaning; but the leading allegorists applied their method to offensive and inoffensive passages alike. (shrink)
In C.Q., January, 1928, pp. 16 sqq., I examined afresh the two discussions of poetry as imitation which are found in Plato's Republic. I pointed out that Plato used the term ‘imitation’ in two senses, a good and a bad. The only kind of poetry which Plato excludes from his ideal state is that which is imitative in the bad sense of the term. He admits, and indeed welcomes, that kind of poetry which is imitative in the good sense , (...) and which he calls either imitative or non-imitative according as he is using the term ‘imitative’ in a good sense or a bad. The kind of poetry which is admitted into the ideal state is certainly imitative; and it is in fact called imitative by Plato himself —of course in the good sense of the word. Now the tenth book begins by stating that the result of the earlier discussion had been the decision to exclude ‘so much of poetry as is imitative.’ The implication is obviously that the remainder will not be excluded. But what are we to call that remainder, unless it be non-imitative in the sense in which the word is here used? (shrink)
It has become a standing reproach upon Plato's treatment of poetry in the Republic that he forgets or misrepresents in the tenth book what he said in the third.According to the earlier discussion, poetry is required to perform important services in the ideal state; its subject-matter will make the young familiar with true doctrines ; its style will reflect the qualities proper to the character of guardian, and therefore—by the principle of imitation—induce and confirm such qualities in the souls of (...) young and old. Poetry, like all other forms of art, must train the young to love and resemble the beauty of truth, so that when reason develops, they will recognize it as an old friend. (shrink)
In many parts of the world, homework is a form of labour characterised by precariousness, lack of regulation, and invisibility and lack of protection of the workers who are often amongst the world's poorest and most exploited. Homework is spreading, due to firm practices such as outsourcing. The analysis and understanding of complex corporate networks may assist with the identification and protection of those most at risk within the supply chain network. It can also expose some of the key ethical (...) issues and dilemmas of supply chain management and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Based on a case-study of the Australian FairWear Campaign (FWC), this article identifies an ethical network that aims to increase corporate accountability (CA) via greater transparency in corporate supply chains and improve work conditions for homeworkers and increase their recognition in the supply chain. (shrink)
There is an increasingly prevalent view among some contemporary Locke scholars that Locke's political philosophy is thoroughly subordinate to theological imperatives, centered on natural law. This article challenges this point of view by critically evaluating this interpretation of Locke as advanced by some of its leading proponents. This interpretation perceives natural law as the governing principle of Locke's political philosophy, and the primary source of transition and reconciliation within it. This article advances a very different reading of Locke's political philosophy, (...) perceiving within it competing imperatives that cannot be subsumed by natural law, and are, in some respects, at odds with it. In this way, the article shows how the “theological” interpretation of Locke's political philosophy, centred on natural law, fails to account for some of that philosophy's fundamental features, and is unable to explain some of its key outcomes, with the result that this interpretation falls short of its critical ambitions. (shrink)
I have shown in an earlier article that from the second half of the fifth century onwards the desire to defend Homer and Hesiod against accusations of immorality was certainly not the main motive which actuated the allegorical interpreters of the early poets. That desire, no doubt, existed; but the part which it played was wholly a subordinate one. In the present article I propose first to consider allegorism in its earlier stages, and to state my case for holding that (...) the practice of allegorical interpretation cannot have originated in this desire of Homeric partisans to exculpate the poet. My view is that the function of allegorism was originally not negative or defensive but rather positive or exegetical. (shrink)
Timothy Stanton is the latest in a line of Locke scholars who, in focusing on Locke's theological commitments, have sought to place these at the center of his political philosophy. Stanton insists that those who interpret Locke's political philosophy in more material terms, centered on individual liberty, government authority, and the need to reconcile both via consent, apply to it a misleading "picture" and fail to perceive its essentials. By showing that this is precisely how Locke himself intended his political (...) philosophy to be understood, with the theology substantially removed, this article shows how Stanton is profoundly mistaken in his interpretation of Locke. (shrink)
A “recent consensus” has emerged in Locke studies that has sought to place theology at the center of Locke's political philosophy, insisting that the validity and cogency of Locke's political conclusions cannot be substantiated independently of the theology that resides at their foundation. This paper argues for the need to distance Locke from God, claiming that not only can we “bracket” the normative conclusions of Locke's political philosophy from their theological foundations, but that this was in fact Locke's own intention, (...) intent as he was to justify these conclusions to a diverse political audience often divided by faith. In other words, this “recent consensus” in Locke studies is premised on an erroneous understanding of Locke's political philosophy, even as advanced by Locke himself. Locke's own philosophical discourse bears witness to the very “bracketing” of his political conclusions from their theological foundations that these Locke scholars claim is impossible. (shrink)
This article looks at liberalism as a political tradition encompassing competing and, at times, incommensurable values. It looks in particular at the potential conflict between the values of free speech and equal respect. Both of these are foundational values for liberalism, in the sense that they arise as normative ideals from the very inception of the liberal tradition itself. Yet from the perspective of this tradition, it is by no means clear which of these values should be prioritized in those (...) instances where they come into conflict. This article insists that the only way these two values can be meaningfully weighed against each other is if their competition can be understood within the broader framework of liberalism and democracy. Within this broader framework it is possible to find criteria which enable us to choose between these values in a non-circular manner — i.e. in ways which do not already presuppose a commitment to the value we wish to support. (shrink)
The problem suggested by this passage cannot be properly appreciated unless it is shown first of all that the treatment of poetry and art in the Laws fundamentally agrees with, though of course in some respects it provides a welcome supplement to, the attitude set forth in the Republic and elsewhere by Plato. The demand that music and poetry should ‘imitate’ the good; and that this ‘imitation’ should have meaning and accuracy, and be free from mere emotionalism directly recalls the (...) doctrine of the Republic and other dialogues on the two kinds of imitation, which I have explained in the Classical Quarterly XXII p. 16, XXVI p. 161; the reason for the demand is the same—the imitation of evil has the same effect on character as the companionship of evil men. As for the effect of this ruling on comedy, the Republic is perhaps not over-clear. But the Laws explains that the comic art is to some extent valuable; its pictures of the ludicrous serve as a warning, and also help to make goodness more intelligible by setting it in relief; hence comedy may be performed for the edification of citizens by slaves or hired aliens under certain restrictions such as that a piece shall not have too long a run and that no ridicule of free men is to be permitted . On tragedy the two dialogues are in full agreement; it must become once more a hymn , using for a good purpose those forms of dramatic representation which are allowed to the poet in Rep. 396, and avoiding the mournful and complaining language of profane tragedy, which merely harrows the feelings and which cannot be used without blasphemy at a festival of the gods. (shrink)
In Plato's Euthyphro two suggestions are offered to account for the accusation of impiety brought against Socrates. The first comes from Euthyphro , who takes it that the accusation is directed primarily against Socrates' ‘divine sign.’ The second is made by Socrates himself , who puts forward the view that he is being brought to trial because he refuses to accept such tales about the gods as Hesiod told regarding the maltreatment of Uranus by Cronus and of Cronus by Zeus—tales (...) which Euthyphro not merely believes but regards as justifying his action in prosecuting his own father. Both these suggestions used to be taken at their face-value, as, for example, by Grote . But according to J. Burnet , followed by A. E. Taylor , neither is meant to be taken seriously. (shrink)
This article challenges the claim that John Locke’s arguments for toleration are fundamentally at odds with any we might now associate with the liberal tradition. By showing how this perspective fundamentally misreads Locke on toleration, it seeks to defend Locke’s own status as one of the founding fathers of the liberal tradition.
The seventeenth century English philosopher, John Locke, is widely recognized as one of the seminal sources of the modern liberal tradition. _Liberty, Toleration and Equality_ examines the development of Locke’s ideal of toleration, from its beginnings, to the culmination of this development in Locke’s fifteen year debate with his great antagonist, the Anglican clergyman, Jonas Proast. Locke, like Proast, was a sincere Christian, but unlike Proast, Locke was able to develop, over time, a perspective on toleration which allowed him to (...) concede liberty to competing views which he, personally, perceived to be "false and absurd". In this respect, Locke sought to affirm what has since become the basic liberal principle that liberty and toleration are only meaningful when they are accorded to views to which we ourselves are profoundly at odds. John William Tate seeks to show how Locke was able to develop this position on toleration over a long intellectual career. Tate also challenges some of the most prominent contemporary perspectives on Locke, within the academic literature, showing how these fall short of perceiving what is essential to Locke’s position. (shrink)