Abstract

What is it to be able to intend to do something? At the end of her ground-breaking book, Agents’ Abilities, Romy Jaster identifies this question as a topic for future research. This article tackles the question from within the framework Jaster assembled for understanding abilities. The discussion takes place in two different spheres: intentions formed in acts of deciding, and intentions not so formed. The gradability of abilities has an important place in Jaster’s framework, and it is explained how abilities to acquire intentions of these two kinds -- including both general and specific abilities—can come in degrees, as she conceives of degrees of ability. Although Jaster “sympathize[s] with the idea that having an ability to intend to [A] is a matter of intending to [A] in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in which there is an overriding reason to intend to [A],” an alternative to this idea is developed.