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Effective deliberation about what to intend: Or striking it rich in a toxin-free environment [Book Review]
Philosophical Studies 79 (1):85 - 93 (1995)
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Citations of this work
In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend.James Morauta - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.
Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions.Randolph Clarke - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):391-409.
Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating.Roberto Fumagalli - 2021 - Theory and Decision 91 (3):337-356.
References found in this work
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Springs of action: understanding intentional behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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