Authors
Victoria McGeer
Princeton University
Abstract
In The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle argued that a more sophisticated understanding of the dispositional nature of ‘intelligent capacities’ could bolster philosophical resistance to the tempting view that the human mind is possessed of metaphysically ‘occult’ powers and properties. This temptation is powerful in the context of accounting for the special qualities of responsible agency. Incompatibilists indulge the temptation; compatibilists resist it, using a variety of strategies. One recent strategy, reminiscent of Ryle’s, is to exploit a more sophisticated understanding of dispositional properties to account for these qualities. But ‘new dispositionalists’ run up against a ‘hard problem’ that threatens the approach. This paper argues that the threat may be averted by embracing a yet more radical ‘Rylean’ view of the distinctive dispositional nature of ‘intelligent capacities’.
Keywords dispositions  responsibility  blame  Ryle  abilities  knowing how  skills  compatibilists  desert
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DOI 10.1093/arisoc/aoy017
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

Scaffolding Agency: A Proleptic Account of the Reactive Attitudes.Victoria McGeer - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):301-323.
Street Smarts.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):161-180.
Abilities.John Maier - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
It’s Up to You.Randolph Clarke - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):328-341.

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