In David Wasserman & Adam Cureton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford University Press (2020)

Authors
Jason Marsh
St. Olaf College
Abstract
Disability-positive philosophers often note a troubling tendency to dismiss what disabled people say about their well-being. This chapter seeks to get clearer on why this tendency might be troubling. It argues that recent appeals to lived experience, testimonial injustice, and certain challenges to adaptive-preference reasoning do not fully explain what is wrong with questioning the happiness of disabled people. It then argues that common attempts to debunk the claim that disabled people are happy are worrisome because they threaten everyone’s well-being and are further challenged by an argument from moral risk.
Keywords disability  well-being  testimonial injustice  skepticism  moral risk  adaptation
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References found in this work BETA

Transformative Experience.Laurie Ann Paul - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Running Risks Morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
The Complicated Relationship of Disability and Well-Being.Stephen M. Campbell & Joseph A. Stramondo - 2017 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 27 (2):151-184.
Abortion and Moral Risk1: D. Moller.D. Moller - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (3):425-443.

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