Relational Equality and Disability Injustice

Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (3):327-357 (2019)
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Abstract

People with disabilities suffer from pervasive inequalities in employment, education, transportation, housing, and health care compared to those who are not disabled. Moreover, people with disabilities are often subject to unjustified stigma and pity. In this paper, I will explain why these disadvantages violate relational egalitarian principles of justice. As I will show, my argument can account for both kinds of inequality that disabled people face.

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2018-10-10

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Jeff Brown
University of Northern Colorado

Citations of this work

Relational egalitarianism.Rekha Nath - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (7):1-12.
Assent and vulnerability in patients who lack capacity.Christopher A. Riddle - 2023 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (7):485-486.
Disability, Society, and Personal Transformation.Sean Aas - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (1):49-74.

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References found in this work

What is the point of equality.Elizabeth Anderson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
Democratic Equality and Political Authority.Daniel Viehoff - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (4):337-375.
Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos.Jonathan Wolff - 1998 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (2):97-122.
At the margins of moral personhood.Eva Kittay - 2005 - Ethics 116 (1):100-131.
Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality.Samuel Scheffler - 2005 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (1):5-28.

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