Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion

Logos and Episteme 3 (4):653-658 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences is challenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

ISBN(s)

20690533

DOI

10.5840/logos-episteme20123414

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Against normative accounts of assertion.Peter Pagin - manuscript
Two more for the knowledge account of assertion.Matthew Benton - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):684-687.
In what sense is knowledge the Norm of assertion?Pascal Engel - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.
Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.
The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion.Rachel McKinnon - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135.
The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.
Assertion and isolated second-hand knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.
Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion.Patrick Greenough - 2010 - In J. H. Cappelen (ed.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Dubious assertions.David Sosa - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.
Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 11-31.
Irksome assertions.Rachel McKinnon & John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):123-128.
Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-12-01

Downloads
334 (#60,265)

6 months
112 (#37,627)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Shaffer
Gustavus Adolphus College

Citations of this work

P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.
Counterevidentials.Laura Caponetto & Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.

Add more citations

References found in this work

True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.
Must we act only on what we know?Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (8):463-473.

Add more references