: In this paper I offer some criticisms of Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. In Dancy’s version moral particularism states that there are neither general nor universal moral principles, that moral action is not the application of principles to particular cases, that moral reasoning has no motivational force because it deduces what must be done by moral principles, and that the agent who acts morally is not a person who has moral principles. However, Dancy’s proposal fails to explain the regularity of moral behavior and the function of stability that moral agents and moral psychology play within social cooperation, nor is it able to explain the possibility of moral progress. Keywords: Jonathan Dancy; Moral Progress; Moral Psychology; Principles; Cooperation La mente morale particolarista Riassunto: In questo articolo espongo alcune critiche al particolarismo morale di Jonathan Dancy. Nella versione di Dancy il particolarismo morale afferma che non ci sono né principi morali generali né universali, che l’azione morale non è l’applicazione di principi a casi particolari, che il ragionamento morale non ha forza motivazionale perché deduce ciò che deve essere fatto dai principi morali, e che l’agente che agisce moralmente non è una persona che ha principi morali. Tuttavia, la proposta di Dancy non riesce a spiegare la regolarità del comportamento morale e la funzione di stabilità che gli agenti morali e la psicologia morale svolgono all’interno della cooperazione sociale, né è in grado di spiegare la possibilità del progresso morale. Parole chiave: Jonathan Dancy; Progresso morale; Psicologia morale; Principi; Cooperazione
Keywords Cooperation  Jonathan Dancy  Moral Progress  Moral Psychology  Principles
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.4453/rifp.2021.0010
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,265
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - Duckworth.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

View all 52 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Real Direction of Dancy’s Moral Particularism.Edmund Wall - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):587-612.
Why Moral Principles?Joe Mintoff - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1133-1159.
Moral Particularism and the Real World.Brad Hooker - 2007 - In Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge. pp. 12--30.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Particularism and Supervenience.Caj Strandberg - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles.Rebecca Lynn Stangl - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):201-229.


Added to PP index

Total views
6 ( #1,133,688 of 2,507,669 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #209,530 of 2,507,669 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes