Oxford University Press (1994)

Abstract
W. J. Mander provides a brief introduction to and critical assessment of the thought of the greatest of the British Idealist philosophers, F. H. Bradley (1846-1924), whose work has been largely neglected in this century. After a general introduction to Bradley's metaphysics and its logical foundations, Mander shows that much of Bradley's philosophy has been seriously misunderstood. Mander argues that any adequate treatment of Bradley's thought must take full account of his unique dual inheritance from the traditions of British empiricism and Hegelian rationalism. The scholarship of recent years is assessed, and new interpretations are offered of Bradley's views about truth, predication, and relations, and of his arguments for idealism.
Keywords Metaphysics
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Call number B1618.B74.M36 1994
ISBN(s) 0198240902   9780198240907
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Bradley’s Regress.Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (11):794-807.
Epistemic Realism in Bradley and Early Moore.Francesco Pesci - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (6).
Theory Of Knowledge In Britain From 1860 To 1950.Mathieu Marion - 2008 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4:5.

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