The limits of cognitive liberalism

Behaviorism 14 (1):1-14 (1986)
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Abstract

The central characteristic of cognitive explanations of behavior is the appeal to inner representations. I examine the grounds which justify representational explanations, seeking the minimum conditions which organisms must meet to be candidates for such explanations. I first discuss Fodor's proposal that representationality be attributed to systems which respond to nonnomic properties, arguing that the distinction between the nomic and nonnomic in perception is fatally ambiguous. Then I turn to an illustrative review of the behavior and neurobiology of Hermissenda crassicornis, a marine mollusk. Concerning this "model system," I compare the representational style of explanation with both behaviorist and neurophysiological explanations. Representational explanation is potentially more comprehensive than its rivals, and thus I conclude that representations are useful posits wherever internal information-bearing states mediate behavior

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reprint Lloyd, Dan (1986) "The Limits of Cognitive Liberalism". Behavior and Philosophy 14(1):1

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Dan Lloyd
Trinity College

Citations of this work

Classical conditioning: The new hegemony.Jaylan Sheila Turkkan - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1):121-137.
What is classical conditioning?W. J. Jacobs - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1):146-146.
The empirical virtues of belief.Andrew Cling - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):303-23.

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