Psychological Explanation and Behavior Broadly Conceived

Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2):137-159 (1997)
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Abstract

I argue that a broad conception of behavior makes considerable headway toward an account of psychological explanation that preserves the intuitive correctness of belief/desire psychological explanations and whose explanatory utility is not undercut by neurophysiological explanations. The rough idea behind a broad conception of behavior is that the basic units of behavior, which constitute the primary explananda of psychology, are themselves essentially goal-directed. As such, behavior supervenes on more than the physical properties of the bodily motions which comprise it; it supervenes also on the historical/teleological properties that give it its goal

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2011-05-29

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Anthony F. Peressini
Marquette University

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