Mind the gap: noncausal explanations of dual properties

Philosophical Studies 181 (4):789-809 (2024)
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Abstract

I identify and characterize a type of noncausal explanation in physics. I first introduce a distinction, between the physical properties of a system, and the representational properties of the mathematical expressions of the system’s physical properties. Then I introduce a novel kind of property, which I shall call a dual property. This is a special kind of representational property, one for which there is an interpretation as a physical property. It is these dual properties that, I claim, are amenable to noncausal (mathematical, in fact) explanations. I discuss a typical example of such a dual property, and an example of an explanation as to why that dual property holds (the explanation of the quantization of the linear momentum).

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Sorin Bangu
University of Bergen

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References found in this work

How scientific models can explain.Alisa Bokulich - 2011 - Synthese 180 (1):33 - 45.
Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon & Anne Fagot-Largeault - 1989 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (2):355.
Minimal Model Explanations.Robert W. Batterman & Collin C. Rice - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (3):349-376.
The directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations.Carl F. Craver & Mark Povich - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 63:31-38.

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