Abstract
Recently there has been a great deal of argument about what justifies references to representational states in explanations of behavior. I discuss Jerry Fodor's claim that it is necessary to ascribe representational states to organisms that respond to "nonnomic properties" of stimuli. Zenon Pylyshyn's (apparently equivalent) claim that it is necessary to ascribe representational states to organisms that respond to "nonprojectable properties" of stimuli and Fodor's claim that an organism's ability to respond to nonnomic properties of stimuli is a criterion of its having representational states. I argue that if Fodor's account of how organisms respond to nonnomic properties of stimuli is correct, we could always replace explanations that appeal to nonnomic properties of stimuli with explanations that appeal only to nomic properties of stimuli. I also argue that, according to Fodor's account, we could not determine whether an organism is responding to nonnomic properties of stimuli unless we already knew whether the explanation of the response includes a reference to a representational state. Thus, given Fodor's account, there is no noncircular way of arguing that it is necessary to ascribe representational states to organisms because they respond to nonnomic properties of stimuli. Finally, I argue that Fodor has not actually provided an account of how organisms respond to nonnomic properties of stimuli and I discuss the prospects of a different strategy for linking the nonnomic properties of stimuli to representational states.