XV—The Russellian Retreat

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320 (2013)

Abstract

Belief does aim at the truth. When our beliefs do not fit the facts, they cannot do what they are supposed to do, because they cannot provide us with reasons. We cannot plausibly deny that a truth norm is among the norms that govern belief. What we should not say is that the truth norm is the fundamental epistemic norm. In this paper, I shall argue that knowledge is the norm of belief and that the truth norm has a derivative status. Only a knowledge‐first approach to epistemic normativity can explain why epistemic assessment has its inward‐looking focus.

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Author's Profile

Clayton Littlejohn
Australian Catholic University

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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Citations of this work

Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch & Julien Dutant (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.
A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.
Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.

View all 64 citations / Add more citations

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