On free will, responsibility and indeterminism: Responses to Clarke, Haji, and Mele

Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):105-121 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper responds to three critical essays on my book, The Significance of Free Will(Oxford, 1996) by Randolph Clarke, Istiyaque Haji and Alfred Mele (which essays appear in this issue and an earlier issue of this journal). This response first explains crucial features of the theory of free will of the book, including the notion of ultimate responsibility.The paper then answers objections of Haji and Mele that the occurrence of undetermined choices would be matters of luck or chance, and so could not be responsible actions. It then responds to concerns of Clarke that indeterminism provides no greater degree of control for defenders of incompatibilist free will and to concerns Clarke has about the notions of "effort" and "willing" in the book. Finally, the paper addresses objections of Haji concerning Frankfurt type-examples and the relation of moral responsibility to the power to act otherwise, and it addresses a concern of Mele's about why we should want a free will that is incompatible with determinism



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,923

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom?E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Indeterminism, explanation, and luck.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (3):211-235.


Added to PP

213 (#97,345)

6 months
17 (#161,721)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Kane
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

On the role of indeterminism in libertarian free will.Robert Kane - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):2-16.
Free will, chance, and mystery.Laura Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-80.
Free Will, Chance, and Mystery.L. Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-180.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.
Free Will and Values.Robert Kane - 1985 - State University of New York Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references