Authors
Ishtiyaque Haji
University of Calgary
Abstract
It has been argued that all compatibilist accounts of free action and moral responsibility succumb to the manipulation problem: evil neurologists or their like may manipulate an agent, in the absence of the agent's awareness of being so manipulated, so that when the agent performs an action, requirements of the compatibilist contender at issue are satisfied. But intuitively, the agent is not responsible for the action. We propose that the manipulation problem be construed as a problem of deviance. In troubling cases of manipulation, psychological elements such as desires and beliefs, among other things, are acquired via causal routes that are deviant relative to causal routes deemed normal or baseline. We develop and defend rudiments of a baseline that is acceptable independently of whether one has compatibilist or incompatibilist leanings.
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DOI 10.1080/0967255042000278076
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism.Gary Watson - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (4):351-365.
Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism.Gary Watson - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (4):353-368.

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Citations of this work BETA

Immigration and Self-Determination.Bas van der Vossen - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (3):270-290.
Selective Hard Compatibilism.Paul Russell - 2010 - In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. pp. 149-73.

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