A proof-theoretic account of classical principles of truth

Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (10):1009-1024 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper explores the interface between principles of self-applicable truth and classical logic. To this end, the proof-theoretic strength of a number of axiomatic theories of truth over intuitionistic logic is determined. The theories considered correspond to the maximal consistent collections of fifteen truth-theoretic principles as isolated in Leigh and Rathjen

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Citations of this work

Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.

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References found in this work

Toward useful type-free theories. I.Solomon Feferman - 1984 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (1):75-111.
An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth.Harvey Friedman & Michael Sheard - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 33 (1):1--21.
Axiomatizing Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten - 2006 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.
Notes on Formal Theories of Truth.Andrea Cantini - 1989 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 35 (2):97-130.
Notes on Formal Theories of Truth.Andrea Cantini - 1989 - Zeitshrift für Mathematische Logik Und Grundlagen der Mathematik 35 (1):97--130.

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