Topoi 31 (1):47-57 (2012)

Authors
Luca Tranchini
Universität Tübingen
Abstract
Validity, the central concept of the so-called ‘proof-theoretic semantics’ is described as correctly applying to the arguments that denote proofs. In terms of validity, I propose an anti-realist characterization of the notions of truth and correct assertion, at the core of which is the idea that valid arguments may fail to be recognized as such. The proposed account is compared with Dummett’s and Prawitz’s views on the matter
Keywords Proof-theoretic semantics  Truth  Assertion
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-012-9121-3
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References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
The Justification of Deduction.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1974 - In Michael Dummett (ed.), Truth and Other Enigmas. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Peter Schroeder-Heister - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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