Abstract

The problem addressed in the dissertation is whether one's life can be said to harm, and if so, what moral obligations individuals have to avoid such harms in terms of their reproductive decision making. The concept of harm is analyzed in terms of the moral obligations drawn from the principle and obligation of nonmaleficence, including the incorporation of the risk of harm and the often overlapping obligations of beneficence and nonmaleficence, and the place of nonmaleficence in the hierarchy of rules. Given this basis, the concept of harm is addressed as it applies to the lives of individuals, concluding that some individuals can be said to occupy "harming lives." Based upon the analysis of nonmaleficence, the connection is made between harming lives and an obligation to avoid them under certain circumstances, trying to incorporate the inherent uncertainty of outcome accompanying predictive decision making. Criteria are outlined by which it may be determined which lives must be avoided. Lastly, a process by which these criteria can be applied in practical decision making is offered, with discussion about the pitfalls of the process and the possibilities of the obligation being incorporated into policy