The expressive rationality of inaccurate perceptions

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40:e6 (2017)
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Abstract

This commentary uses the dynamic of identity-protective cognition to pose a friendly challenge to Jussim (2012). Like other forms of information processing, this one is too readily characterized as a bias. It is no mistake, however, to view identity-protective cognition as generating inaccurate perceptions. The “bounded rationality” paradigm incorrectly equates rationality with forming accurate beliefs. But so does Jussim's critique.

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Dan M. Kahan
Yale University

Citations of this work

Socially adaptive belief.Daniel Williams - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (3):333-354.
Epistemic Irrationality in the Bayesian Brain.Daniel Williams - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):913-938.
Dangerous beliefs, effective signals.Eric Funkhouser - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (5):969-989.

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References found in this work

The Fixation of Belief.C. S. Peirce - 1877 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1-15.
Value in Ethics and Economics.Paul Seabright - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):303.
A model of heuristic judgment.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. pp. 267--293.
The Politics of Motivation.James N. Druckman - 2012 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 24 (2):199-216.
The Politics of Motivation.James N. Druckman - 2012 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 24 (2):199-216.

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