4 found
Shane Frederick [6]Shane William Frederick [1]
  1. .Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
    No categories
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   348 citations  
  2. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 49-81.
    The first section introduces a distinction between 2 families of cognitive operations, called System 1 and System 2. The second section presents an attribute-substitution model of heuristic judgment, which elaborates and extends earlier treatments of the topic. The third section introduces a research design for studying attribute substitution. The fourth section discusses the controversy over the representativeness heuristic. The last section situates representativeness within a broad family of prototype heuristics, in which properties of a prototypical exemplar dominate global judgments concerning (...)
    No categories
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   122 citations  
  3. A model of heuristic judgment.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. pp. 267--293.
    The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a study of the statistical intuitions of experts, who were found to be excessively confident in the replicability of results from small samples. The persistence of such systematic errors in the intuitions of experts implied that their intuitive judgments may be governed by fundamentally different processes than the slower, more deliberate computations they had been trained to execute. The ancient idea that cognitive processes can be partitioned (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  4. The formation and revision of intuitions.Andrew Meyer & Shane Frederick - 2023 - Cognition 240 (C):105380.
    This paper presents 59 new studies (N = 72,310) which focus primarily on the “bat and ball problem.” It documents our attempts to understand the determinants of the erroneous intuition, our exploration of ways to stimulate reflection, and our discovery that the erroneous intuition often survives whatever further reflection can be induced. Our investigation helps inform conceptions of dual process models, as “system 1” processes often appear to override or corrupt “system 2” processes. Many choose to uphold their intuition, even (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation