Technological Enthusiasm: Morally Commendable or Reprehensible?

Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (2):969-980 (2020)
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Abstract

Technological enthusiasm is a value that can influence engineering, shape technologies and subsequently transform human lifestyles. Despite its significant role, up until now, there has been little research done on this value. The dominant idea is that this value is commendable. However, based on consequentialism, a recently proposed idea describes TE as neither morally commendable nor reprehensible. In this paper, three arguments are presented against this recent idea, and a new idea is introduced, which challenges not only commendation for TE but also neutrality of TE. Further, it is shown that a virtue ethics approach can be adopted to evaluate the moral role of TE. In the approach, TE can be considered a character trait or a virtue/vice. Then, three arguments are proposed to indicate that TE is not a virtue but a vice. This paper illustrates some advantages of virtue ethics in ethical evaluation of a problem in which consequentialism or utilitarianism is not effective.

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