Virtue-based approaches to engineering ethics have recently received considerable attention within the field of engineering education. Proponents of virtue ethics in engineering argue that the approach is practically and pedagogically superior to traditional approaches to engineering ethics, including the study of professional codes of ethics and normative theories of behavior. This paper argues that a virtue-based approach, as interpreted in the current literature, is neither practically or pedagogically effective for a significant subpopulation within engineering: engineers with high functioning autism spectrum (...) disorder. Because the main argument for adopting a character-based approach is that it could be more successfully applied to engineering than traditional rule-based or algorithmic ethical approaches, this oversight is problematic for the proponents of the virtue-based view. Furthermore, without addressing these concerns, the wide adoption of a virtue-based approach to engineering ethics has the potential to isolate individuals with ASD and to devalue their contributions to moral practice. In the end, this paper gestures towards a way of incorporating important insights from virtue ethics in engineering that would be more inclusive of those with ASD. (shrink)

For over 80 years, the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) has been a leader in the promotion of ethical practice within the field of engineering. One of the Society's greatest contributions is the formation and adoption of the NSPE Code of Ethics. But the code, with its six "Fundamental Canons," is only truly instructive if engineers can bridge the gap between principles and action. Here there is no substitute for personal reflection on the ethical and philosophical issues that underlie (...) the code. If done well, such reflection provides an indispensable basis for moral problem solving. Beyond the Code: A Philosophical Guide to Engineering Ethics is designed to complement the NSPE Code of Ethics by helping readers "go beyond" in their understanding of the philosophical issues bound up in the code. Each chapter addresses one of the Fundamental Canons of the NSPE code, and provides a philosophical analysis of the various parts of each canon by employing contemporary and classical texts. This unique approach to engineering ethics guides students and professionals in their readings of the appended selections to refine their understanding of the code in order to apply it to the practical challenges of today's engineers. Key Features: Is the first introduction to engineering ethics that helps students understand and apply the NSPE Code of Ethics to engineering practice Includes a Preface from Arthur E. Schwartz, NSPE Deputy Executive Directorand General Counsel, and NAFE Executive Director As a hybrid text, includes primary philosophical texts with extensiveintroductions and guided reading questionsfrom the book's three authors Offers case studies from the NSPE Board of Ethical Review, allowing students to see a direct connection between the issues discussed in the text and real-world engineering practice Includes the following pedagogical aids: "Key Terms and Concepts" for each chapter "Preparing to Read" sections before each primary source reading "Guided Reading Questions" after each primary source reading "Going Beyond--Our Questions for a Deep Dive" after each case study. (shrink)

Epistemic modality concerns what is possible given a body of knowledge or evidence. Cases involving epistemic modals, present an interesting semantic challenge: in order to give a semantic treatment of epistemic modals, we must explain how informational states figure in the semantic representation of these terms. According to John MacFarlane’s (2011, 2014) view – Assessor Relativism – epistemic modal claims are assessment-sensitive in that their truth depends on what is known by the assessor at the time he or she assesses (...) the claim. Hence, truth for epistemic modal claims varies with the context of assessment. Critics of MacFarlane’s approach, such as Anthony Gillies and Kai von Fintel (2008) point to so called “ignorant assessor cases,” ones in which the assessor knows less than the speaker. They claim that such cases pose a serious problem for Assessment Relativism. I argue, however, that these cases do not uncover a flaw in the assessment relativist’s semantics. The apparent problems only seem to arise because the authors have not given adequate attention to the epistemic details of the cases. In making my argument, I present a larger methodological point about the role of epistemic data in semantic theory construction. I claim that, it is often difficult to distinguish the boundary between semantics and epistemology when discussing epistemic modals. As a result, linguists and philosophers of language sometimes fail distinguish between epistemic intuitions that are directly relevant to the semantics and those that are indirectly relevant. I conclude that we do not have to complicate the semantics of epistemic modals in order to accommodate epistemic data such as intuitions about epistemic warrant. (shrink)