Uneasy Virtue

New York: Cambridge University Press (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The predominant view of moral virtue can be traced back to Aristotle. He believed that moral virtue must involve intellectual excellence. To have moral virtue one must have practical wisdom - the ability to deliberate well and to see what is morally relevant in a given context. Julia Driver challenges this classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues which do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Some 'virtues of ignorance' are counterexamples to accounts of virtue which hold that moral virtue must involve practical wisdom. Modesty, for example, is generally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments. Driver argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective which holds that virtue is simply a character trait which systematically produces good consequences.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,685

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Driver's virtues.Michael Slote - 2004 - Utilitas 16 (1):22-32.
The virtues of ignorance.Julia Driver - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (7):373-384.
Does Moral Virtue Require Knowledge? A Response to Julia Driver.Michael Jeffrey Winter - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):533 - 546.
Response to my critics.Julia Driver - 2004 - Utilitas 16 (1):33-41.
Aesop's fox: Consequentialist virtue meets egocentric bias.Dale L. Clark - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):727 – 737.
Virtue consequentialism.Ben Bradley - 2005 - Utilitas 17 (3):282-298.
Ignorance and Virtue.Ronald Sandler - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (2):261-272.
Introduction: Virtue and vice.Heather Battaly - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):1-21.
Self-Knowledge and Moral Virtue.Kathleen Ann Poorman Dougherty - 2000 - Dissertation, The University of Oklahoma
Modesty without Illusion.Jason Brennan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):111-128.
Kant's Conception of Virtue.Lara Denis - 2006 - In Paul Guyer (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
292 (#61,098)

6 months
22 (#98,310)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Julia Driver
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations.Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):509-539.
Inquiry and the epistemic.David Thorstad - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2913-2928.
Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.
Rational Moral Ignorance.Zach Barnett - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):645-664.
Humility in Management.Antonio Argandona - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 132 (1):63-71.

View all 86 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references