Agency and reductionism about the self

In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. University of Rijeka. pp. 255-284 (2017)
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Abstract

Abstract The goal of this chapter is to provide an opinionated overview of the psychologically based account of personal identity and the role of agency within such an account. I describe the essential points of the psychological criterion of personal identity. Then, I discuss how the psychological criterion is related to the Reductionist View of personal identity and whether it is committed to what Derek Parfit names the Extreme Claim. I further discuss how the agency-based views of personal identity can be accommodated within Derek Parfit’s psychologically based view of personal identity. I end the chapter by discussing how an agency-based view, as most notably developed by Christine Korsgaard, could be used to vindicate practical concerns that are traditionally related to personal identity.

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Marko Jurjako
University of Rijeka

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

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