Abstract

In his book, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit distinguished between Reductionist and Non-Reductionist theories of personal identity. On his version of Reductionism, the facts relevant to a person's identity consist of a series of interrelated mental and/or physical events. On Non-Reductionist views, what unifies the experiences of a person is always something more than the relations these experiences hold to one another. ;Parfit and others have suggested that Reductionist accounts of identity make certain forms of self-interest irrational. If these arguments were successful, Parfit's arguments concerning personal identity would have broad implications for moral theory. I show that Reductionism does not make self-interest irrational. ;However, believing Reductionism should change the way we think of self-interest. For example, Reductionism opens up the possibility of adopting a theory of identity on which self-interest and morality coincide in a broad range of cases. I sketch an argument in favor of adopting such a theory of identity. In addition, Reductionism undermines the all-things-considered desires model of self-interest. If Reductionism is true, it cannot be in my interest to act upon just any sequence of desires. ;One of the features of Reductionism results in a changed conception of self-interest also seems to cause a problem for the theory. Some philosophers have objected that Reductionism cannot account for agency. They believe that Reductionism leaves out the thinker of thoughts, and the performer of actions. Employing Herbert Fingarette's description of agency, I show that there is no obvious incompatibility between our experience of agency, and a Reductionist theory of identity. Fingarette believes that his description of agency makes a life devoted to self-interest irrational. I show that he is mistaken. However, his work on agency does undermine one justification of a life devoted exclusively to self-interest