VIII—Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):187-206 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Peer Reviewed.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance.James Joyce - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2):187 - 206.
Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer.Cory Davia & Michele Palmira - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):605-625.
Deference Done Right.Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19.
Resolute conciliationism.John Pittard - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):442-463.
Outsourcing Concepts: Deference, the Extended Mind, and Expanding our Epistemic Capacity.Cathal O'Madagain - 2018 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Emergent Chance.Christian List & Marcus Pivato - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):119-152.
Expressing first-person authority.Matthew Parrott - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2215-2237.
Deference and description.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1333-1353.
Moral Deference and Authentic Interaction.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (7):346-357.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-11-29

Downloads
60 (#259,763)

6 months
4 (#754,937)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

James M. Joyce
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.
Dynamic Humeanism.Michael Townsen Hicks - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):983-1007.
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.
Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.
Correcting the guide to objective chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.

View all 9 references / Add more references