Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2):187 - 206 (2007)
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James M. Joyce
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

Dynamic Humeanism.Michael Townsen Hicks - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):983-1007.
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.
Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.

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References found in this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.

View all 10 references / Add more references