VIII.—Truth

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:141-162 (1959)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Michael Dummett; VIII.—Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 141–162, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/59.1.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,881

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Truth and the Past.Michael Dummett - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
Frege’s Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
Antirealism and universal knowability.Michael Hand - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):25 - 39.
Redundant truth.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1992 - Ratio 5 (1):24-37.
Of What Kind of Thing is Truth a Property?Michael Dummett - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.
Truth.Michael Glanzberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Truth and the Past.Michael Dummett - 2003 - Columbia University Press.
The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values.Lynch Michael - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-aptness.Michael P. Lynch - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158.
Revising the logic of logical revision.J. Salerno - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (2):211-227.
Nietzsche, Truth, and the Horror of Existence.Philip J. Kain - 2006 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (1):41 - 58.
The concept of truth.Richard Campbell - 2011 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-19

Downloads
24 (#657,113)

6 months
16 (#157,007)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.
The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.
A Modality Called ‘Negation’.Francesco Berto - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):761-793.
The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.

View all 200 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references