The epistemic significance of disagreement

In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196 (2005)
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Abstract

Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty

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original Kelly, Tom (2005) "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement". In Szabo Gendler, Tamar, Hawthorne, John, Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1, pp. : Oxford University Press UK (2005)
reprint Kelly, Thomas (2018) "The epistemic significance of disagreement". In Fantl, Jeremy, McGrath, Matthew, Sosa, Ernest, Contemporary epistemology: an anthology, pp. 167-196: Wiley (2018)

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Thomas Kelly
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..

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