Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):95-118 (2002)

Authors
Andrew Jorgensen
Temple University (PhD)
Abstract
Russell's objections to object-theory have been refuted by the proofs of the consistency of Meinong's system given by various writers. These proofs exploit technical distinctions that Meinong apparently uses very little if at all. Instead, Meinong introduces a theoretical postulate called the modal moment. I describe this postulate and its place in Meinong's system, and I argue that it has been much under-rated by Meinong's logician expositors.
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-90000776
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Meinong on Intending.Andrew Kenneth Jorgensen - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):415-427.

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